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Polymatrix games concern a class of noncooperative multiperson games in nor-
mal form. Characteristic for these games is that the payos for any player are
additive in the payos obtained against the individual other players. Harsanyi
and Selten (1988) developed the tracing procedure for selecting an equilibrium in
general noncooperative games. However, its practical application may be cumber-
some because of nonlinearities involved. In this paper we show that an adapted
version of the algorithm developed by van den Elzen and Talman (1991) may serve
as a nite method for computerizing the linear tracing procedure when applied to
polymatrix games. The method works via complementary pivoting and generates a
piecewise linear path. This path constitutes a projection of the path generated by
the linear tracing procedure which is in general nonlinear. Stated in game-theoretic
terms, the path generated by the pivoting procedure describes the adjustment of
the beliefs underlying the linear tracing procedure.
Keywords: Polymatrix game, linear tracing procedure, equilibrium selection, comple-
mentary pivoting, expanding set, computation.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we are concerned with polymatrix games as formulated by Janovskaya
(1968). These games are a generalization of the well-known bi-matrix games. Now we
deal with more players, but the payo that a player obtains when playing a certain
strategy consists of the sum of the payos obtained from playing against each individual
player apart. The canonical example for this type of games concerns two-player normal
form games with incomplete information, i.e. one or both players are uncertain about
the type of the other player.
For these games we want to consider the linear tracing procedure as originally devel-
oped by Harsanyi (1975). This procedure constitutes an important tool in the equilibrium
selection theory of Harsanyi (1976). Later on this selection theory was elaborated in the
standard work of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). The linear tracing procedure operates
in so-called basic games. Roughly speaking, these are subgames having no inferior ac-
tions. Throughout the paper we will assume that we are dealing with games that are
basic. The procedure starts from a prior, representing the initial guesses of the indi-
vidual players about the behaviour of the other players. In their theory, Harsanyi and
Selten assume that this prior is common over all players, i.e. all players have the same
initial ideas about a certain player. The players now start reacting optimally against
that prior. An equilibrium is reached by tracing a homotopy path along which more and
more information about the whole game is revealed by increased interaction among the
players, whereas simultaneously the weight of the prior decreases. Of course, the selected
equilibrium depends in general on the specic prior. However, given a certain prior, the
procedure is well-dened for a generic game. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) also developed
a variant of the linear tracing procedure, namely the logaritmic tracing procedure. By
adding a logaritmic term to the payos, the method is always well-dened. However, for
practical computation the method seems to be of no use. In the sequel we will only deal
with the linear tracing procedure.
Previously, van den Elzen and Talman (1995) presented a constructive method for
mimicking the tracing procedure in case of bi-matrix games. That method was already
presented in van den Elzen and Talman (1991) in a dierent context. Here, we present
a generalization for polymatrix games. For that we use the more general method as
presented in van den Elzen and Talman (1994), again in a very dierent setting. The
algorithm presented is not only convenient as a computationally attractive and construc-
tive method to handle the tracing procedure. Also as an algorithm for computing an
equilibrium in a polymatrix game it seems to be superior to existing methods based on
Howson (1972).
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The contents of the paper are as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notation and
dene the polymatrix game. Also some variants that can be handled are discussed. Next,
we show in Section 3 the relation between the linear tracing procedure and our procedure
in the context of polymatrix games. Section 4 provides a more detailed description of the
working of our procedure. We illustrate this with an example as given by Harsanyi and
Selten (1988). Finally, in Section 5 we consider the method in relation to the algorithm
of Howson (1972).
2 The polymatrix game
Let us start with some preliminaries. For given integer s > 0, we denote by Is the set
f1; : : : ; sg. Furthermore, IRm+ stands for the nonnegative orthant of the m-dimensional
Euclidean space, i.e. IRm+ = fx 2 IR
mjxr  0; 8r 2 Img. Related to a subset X  IR
m
we denote by bd(X) the boundary of X relative to its ane hull. Given two vectors
x and y in IRm, we denote by [x; y] the line segment of vectors between x and y, i.e.
[x; y] = fz 2 IRmjz = x + (1   )y; 0    1g. Occasionally, [x; y] denotes a curve
connecting x and y, rather than a line segment, as will be clear from the context. Open
and half-open segments are denoted by (x; y) and (x; y] or [x; y), respectively, with ob-
vious meaning. By e(r) we denote the r-th standard unit vector, whose dimension will
be clear from the context. Similarly, we denote by 0 and e the vector of zeroes and the
vector of ones of appropriate length, respectively. Furthermore, by x> (A>) we mean
the transpose of a vector x (matrix A). Finally, given a matrix A, the k-th column of A
is indicated by Ak.
A polymatrix game as dened by Janovskaya (1968) is a special type of a noncoop-
erative multiperson game, with say N players. Let us index the players by i, i 2 IN .
Player i, i 2 IN , has ni pure actions, with action k 2 Ini denoted by (i; k). Together
these actions constitute the action set I(i) of player i, i.e. I(i) = f(i; 1); : : : ; (i; ni)g. The
total action set is denoted by I, i.e. I = [Ni=1I(i). Characteristic for polymatrix games
is that the interaction between any pair of players is independent from the behaviour of
the other players. By Aij, i 6= j, we denote the partial payo matrix of player i related to
the interaction with player j. Of course, the dimension of this matrix is ninj, and the
element Aijkl denotes the payo to player i playing (i; l) from the interaction with player
j playing action (j; k). The partial payo to player j in that situation is indicated by
A
ji
lk. Summarizing, the polymatrix game   is denoted by





The case N = 2 corresponds to the standard bi-matrix game.
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Allowing for mixed strategies we derive that the strategy space of player i equals the
(ni 1)-dimensional unit simplex denoted by S
ni 1. More precisely, Sni 1 := fqi 2 IR
ni
+ jPni
k=1 qik = 1g. In general, a strategy vector in the game is denoted by q 2 S, where
q = (q>1 ; : : : ; q
>




polytope S is called the strategy space of the game. Sometimes we denote a strategy
vector q as (qi; q i), where q i indicates the strategies of all players except i. Given a







A strategy vector q 2 S is a Nash equilibrium of   if
Hi(q
)  Hi(qi; q

 i); 8qi 2 S
ni 1; 8i 2 IN : (2.2)
The set of Nash equilibria of the polymatrix game   is denoted by NE( ).
The canonical situation that can be described by a polymatrix game concerns two-
player games in normal form with incomplete information. Assume that the potential
number of types of player i, i 2 I2, is jTij. Then the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium can
be seen as a Nash equilibrium for the game with jT1j + jT2j players, one for each type.
The payos related to each pair of types for the dierent players are independent of the
play by the other types. Another example of a polymatrix game concerns a model of a
homogeneous oligopoly with linear costs and demands (see Quintas (1989)).
However, we can also look at polymatrix games from a totally dierent angle. In fact,
polymatrix games can be seen as linearized noncooperative games in normal form. If we
linearize the expected payo functions of a normal form game around a certain strategy
vector, i.e. we take the rst-order Taylor expansion, then we obtain a polymatrix game
(see van den Elzen and Talman (1994)).
Finally, we note that the algorithm discussed in this paper can also be applied to a
more general class of polymatrix games as presented in Gowda and Sznajder (1996) for
two players and in Mohan and Neogy (1994) for the general case. In these games the









where the set Aij consists of a nite number of payo matrices. Now, any player can
select row by row. Of course, if Aij consists of only one element then we are back in the
standard polymatrix game.
3 Comparison of both procedures
Let be given an N -player polymatrix game  . As mentioned in the introduction the
linear tracing procedure starts from a common prior p = (p>1 ; : : : ; p
>
N ) 2 S, where pi
denotes the idea of players j 6= i about the strategy handled by player i. Thus, these
opinions are taken to be equal among all players. Next, Harsanyi and Selten (1988)
consider games  tp, t 2 [0; 1], with expected payo functions H
tp




i (q) = tHi(q) + (1   t)Hi(qi; p i): (3.1)
Now, the linear tracing procedure generates a path L( ; p) in the set
L( ; p) := f(q; t) 2 S  [0; 1] j q 2 NE( tp)g; (3.2)
that connects Sf0g and Sf1g. Thus, at t = 0 the players start by playing optimally,
in fact optimizing, against the prior. Next, by increasing t gradually more information
about the game is revealed and the players interact more and more while playing Nash.
Finally, an equilibrium of the original game is obtained. The linear tracing procedure
is generically well-dened, i.e. there exists a unique path L( ; p) for almost all games
given a certain prior p.
From (3.1) and (3.2) we derive that the linear tracing procedure traces a homotopy
path in the payos. Alternatively, the method of van den Elzen and Talman (1991) for-
mulates a homotopy in the strategies. To become more precise, we need some additional
notation. For given b 2 [0; 1], let Sp(b) := fq 2 S j q  bpg. Note that Sp(0) = S
whereas Sp(1) = fpg. The set of restricted Nash equilibria of the polymatrix game  
with strategies restricted to Sp(b) is denoted by NESp(b)( ). The pivoting procedure now
generates a path B( ; p) in the set
B( ; p) := fq 2 S j q 2 NESp(b)( ); b 2 [0; 1]g; (3.3)
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connecting p 2 NESp(1)( ) and a q
 2 NESp(b)( ) for some b
  0, with q being a Nash
equilibrium of the game. Thus, this procedure obtains a Nash equilibrium via a sequence
of restricted Nash equilibria, where the restricted set of strategies expands from fpg to
S.
For polymatrix games it now holds that whenever the path generated by the linear
tracing procedure exists it is equivalent, up to projection, to the path generated by the
pivoting procedure. This will be shown in the theorem below. For the special case of
bi-matrix games this was already shown in van den Elzen and Talman (1995).
Theorem 3.1. Let be given a polymatrix game   and a prior p. Furthermore, let q
and b be as above. If the path L( ; p) is unique then the part of L( ; p) related to t 2
[0; 1   b] is in 1-1 correspondence to the path B( ; p). More precisely, the pair (q; t) 2
L( ; p) relates to tq + (1   t)p 2 B( ; p). Furthermore, the path f(q; t) 2 L( ; p) j
t > 1   bg is nonlinear in t and corresponds to q 2 B( ; p), with q = tq + (1   t)p,
8t > 1  b.
Proof. Consider a pair (q; t) 2 L( ; p), t 2 [0; 1 b]. From (3.1) and the linear structure
of the payos, it is obvious that 8i 2 IN , qi is optimal against tq i + (1   t)p i. Thus,
the vector tq+(1  t)p 2 NESp(1 t)( ). But the latter vector is on the path B( ; p). For
t > 1   b we obtain that the vector tq + (1  t)p is equal to q, i.e. q is nonlinear in t.
On the other hand, let q 2 B( ; p). In case q 2 NESp(b)( ) with b > b
 then q can
be uniquely written as q = bp + (1   b)q, where q 2 S. Furthermore, the actions corre-
sponding to positive components of q are optimal against all strategy vectors in Sp(b).
Thus, 8i, qi is optimal against (1   b)q i + bp i. But, again from (3.1) we then infer
that q 2 NE( 1 bp ). If q 2 NESp(b)( ), b  b
, then q = q = bp + (1   b)q(b), with
q(b) 2 NE( 1 bp ). 2
From the rst part of the proof we derive that the path generated by the pivoting
procedure is indeed a path of adapted beliefs, i.e. given (q; t) 2 L( ; p), qi is optimal
against the beliefs tq i + (1  t)p i, 8i. But tq + (1  t)p 2 B( ; p). From Theorem 3.1
we further conclude that t going from zero to one in the tracing procedure corresponds
to b going from one to some b  0 in the pivoting procedure. Crucial for the proof
is the linear structure in the payos of polymatrix games, i.e. 8q 2 S, 8t 2 [0; 1],
Hi(qi; tq i+(1 t)p i) = tHi(q)+(1 t)Hi(qi; p i). For general N -person noncooperative
games Theorem 3.1 will not hold.
Because the two methods are generically equivalent, knowledge about one method
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can be applied to the other. In van den Elzen and Talman (1991) it was proved that
the pivoting procedure ends up in a perfect equilibriumwhenever the prior is completely
mixed, i.e. all its components are positive. With the theorem above we derive that
this goes through for the linear tracing procedure. This is especially relevant because
Harsanyi and Selten are searching for perfect equilibria. Here we derive that pertubations
of the game are not necessary for that in case the prior is completely mixed.
The crucial dierence between both methods is that the path generated by the pivot-
ing procedure is piecewise linear, whereas the path of the linear tracing procedure may
have nonlinear segments. One such nonlinearity has already explicitly been discussed in
the theorem. However, nonlinearities occur frequently. This can be veried from Theo-
rem 3.1 where we derived that q 2 Sp(b) generated by the pivoting procedure is reected
in ( 1
1 b
(q   bp); 1   b) generated by the linear tracing procedure.
4 The pivoting procedure
In this section we rst show that the procedure of van den Elzen and Talman, when
applied to polymatrix games, is in fact a complementary pivoting procedure that can
easily be implemented on a computer. Next, we illustrate the procedure along with the
example given in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), Section 4.19.
Again, let be given a polymatrix game   =





, and a prior
p. From (3.3) we derive that the pivoting procedure considers restricted Nash equilibria.
More precisely, it considers Nash equilibria of   where the strategy space is restricted
to Sp(b), with b 2 [0; 1]. To characterize these Nash equilibria we rst introduce the
marginal payo functions. The marginal payo function of player i, i 2 IN , is the






Concerning the interpretation of the marginal payos, observe that Hik(q), k 2 Ini ,
denotes the payo for player i if he plays action (i; k) with probability one, whereas the
other players play q i. Now each vector q 2 NESp(b)( ), with b 2 [0; 1], is characterized
as follows: q 2 S and 8(i; k) 2 I,
qik = bpik if Hik(q) < max` Hi`(q)
qik  bpik if Hik(q) = max` Hi`(q):
(4.2)
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Expression (4.2) is quite obvious. At unrestricted Nash equilibria the nonoptimal actions
are played with probability zero. Restricted to Sp(b) these are played with the minimally
allowed probability. Next, we add slack variables in system (4.2) in order to get rid of
the inequalities. By Ti(q) we denote the set of optimal actions of player i at the strategy
vector q. The set of all optimal actions at q is denoted by T (q). Sometimes when it
is not confusing, we will not indicate the dependency of Ti and T on q. Furthermore,
8i 2 IN , max` Hi`(q) is denoted by i. With all of this and by substituting (4.1) into
(4.2), we can rewrite the set B( ; p) as the set of strategy vectors q satisfying 8i 2 IN













(i;k)2Ti(q) ik = 1 b, b 2 [0; 1], ik  0 for (i; k) 2 Ti(q), and ih  0; (i; h) 62 Ti(q).
Next, we substitute the rst set of equations in (4.3) into the second set and collect




































































































with b 2 [0; 1], ik  0, and ih  0.
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The last N equations in the system above follow from summing up for each i 2 IN
the rst set of equations in (4.3). These equations, together with b  0 and ik  0,
express that q 2 S. Observe that system (4.4) contains
P
i2IN




(ni + 1) unknowns. Assuming standard nondegeneracy, the system has
a 1-dimensional piecewise linear manifold of solutions. The pivoting algorithm traces a
specic path in that manifold. At the starting vector p we have that b = 1, Ti(p) = (i; ki),
with Hiki(p) = max`
Hi`(p) and i = Hiki(p), i 2 IN . Furthermore, ik = i  
Hik(p),
(i; k) 6= (i; ki). All other variables are zero. Next, the algorithm decreases b from 1.
This implies by the last N equations that 8i 2 IN , iki is increased from zero. If the
variable ih, (i; h) 62 Ti, becomes zero then the complementary variable ih is increased
from zero, and vice versa. Finally, the algorithm stops if b = 0 or if ih = 0, 8(i; h) 62 T
with pih > 0.
We know already that the algorithm generates a sequence of restricted Nash equilibria.
However, in the sequel it will be handy to give an interpretation in terms of beliefs that
directly follows from the algorithm. Firstly, at the start each player has a unique optimal
reply against the other players' strategies, being action (i; ki) for player i 2 IN . From the
start the common beliefs related to these N actions are increased (iki is increased from
zero), whereas all other probabilities are, relatively to the starting probabilities, equally
decreased (decrease in b). If along the path some action (i; h) becomes optimal (ih = 0),
then the related relative probability is increased above the relative probabilities of the
other nonoptimal actions. More precisely, ih is increased from zero which induces that
qih
pih
> b (qih > 0 if pih = 0). Reversely, if the probability (belief) attached to an ac-
tion that was optimal previously becomes relatively minimal (ik = 0), then the related
probability relative to p is kept equal to that of all other nonoptimal actions ( qik
pik
= b,
or qik = 0 if pik = 0), and ik may increase from zero, i.e. the action becomes nonoptimal.
Example 4.1. Let us illustrate both procedures along with an example taken from
Harsanyi and Selten (1988), Section 4.19. There are 3 players each having 2 actions.























All other partial payo matrices are zero matrices. This polymatrix game has
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. At the pure equilibria all the players play their rst (sec-
ond) action.
We rst apply the pivoting algorithm. We start at the prior p given in the example
















. The path generated
by the pivoting algorithm is depicted in Figure 4.1. The bar represents the strategy
space S. The numbers in the tuples correspond to actions of players. For example, the
vertex (2; 1; 1) indicates the strategy vector at which both players 2 and 3 play their rst
action, whereas the rst player plays his second action. Further, the top (bottom) of
the strategy space consists of strategy vectors q at which q11 = 1 (q11 = 0) etc. Also,
some crucial information concerning the marginal payos is denoted in the gure. For
example, at q31 =
17
32
it holds that H11(q) = H12(q), i.e. player 1 is indierent concerning
his actions. The same holds for player 2 if q31 =
9
14

























































































































































(1; 1; 2) (1; 2; 2)
Figure 4.1. The path of strategy vectors generated in S = S1S1S1 by the pivoting
algorithm starting at p.
At p we derive for the marginal payo vectors that H1(p) = (150; 102)
> , H2(p) =
(25; 27)>, and H3(p) = (72; 80)
>. Thus, from p the probabilities related to the ac-
tions (1; 1), (2; 2), and (3; 2) are increased, i.e. in Figure 4.1 the algorithm moves into

































































































(1; 0)>; (1; 0)>; (1; 0)>

f(1; 1); (2; 1); (3; 1)g 0
The pivoting procedure traces a piecewise linear path of belief vectors linking the prior p
and the Nash equilibrium q of the polymatrix game. Computationally, the pivoting pro-
cedure obtains the equilibrium in ve steps. Remarkable in this example is the increase





moves from q̂ to ~q. Thus, the restricted set of actions shrinks along this piece of the path.
Let us now consider the linear tracing procedure operating on this example. Starting
from the same prior p, it turns out that player 1 plays his rst pure strategy along the
whole path from t = 0 to t = 1. This enables us to depict the path generated by the
tracing procedure simply by only considering the relevant part of the strategy space.
For most priors this would be impossible because the introduction of the homotopy
parameter leads in principle to 4-dimensional space S  [0; 1]. The parameter b in the
pivoting procedure gives no such problems because this parameter is depicted within S.
The path is represented in Figure 4.2 which is taken from Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
Observe that the increase of b during the pivoting procedure is reected in a decrease




at N in the tracing procedure. This is of course in accordance
with Theorem 3.1. Also the remainder of that theorem can be veried for this example.




(1; 0)>; (0; 1)>; (0; 1)>

is an equilibrium of  tp. In the pivoting procedure this line segment corresponds to the
segment [p; q].
In this example we see the occurrence of a nonlinear segment in the linear tracing
procedure, as the parameter t goes backwards. However, the related piece of the path
generated by the pivoting procedure is piecewise linear. These nonlinearities make it
dicult to generate the path of the linear tracing procedure directly and with precision.
The pivoting procedure may serve as an adequate computational technique for generat-

















































































































(1; 2; 1) (1; 1; 1)
t = 1
6
(1; 2; 2) (1; 1; 2)
M
N
Figure 4.2. The path in S  [0; 1] generated by the linear tracing procedure starting
from prior p. Only strategy vectors with player 1 playing e(1) are represented.
Remark. For the game   as presented in the example, the set B( ; p) contains exactly
one other piecewise linear path connecting the other two equilibria. More precisely, the
path connects the following strategy vectors
q T b

(0; 1)>; (0; 1)>; (0; 1)>












































f(1; 1); (1; 2); (2; 2); (3; 1); (3; 2)g 0
The path above corresponds to a partly nonlinear path in L( ; p) that con-
nects the same two Nash equilibria in S  f1g. More precisely, the
path connects
































5 Relation to the Howson algorithm
In the introduction we already indicated that the pivoting procedure can also be viewed
upon as an algorithm for solving polymatrix games. As such it may be compared with
other algorithms related to this class of games. The standard algorithm for solving
polymatrix games was presented by Howson (1972). This procedure rst rewrites the
equilibrium problem into the form of a Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP). Next,
this LCP is solved by a complementary pivoting procedure. For the moment we conne
ourselves to an interpretation in game-theoretic terms of the path generated by the
Howson-procedure. The procedure starts from an arbitrary pure strategy vector, i.e.
each player uses a pure strategy. Next, the procedure searches for an equilibrium for the
rst player given the initial stategies of the other players. In fact, a decision problem for
player 1 is solved. Next, the same is done for player 2 while player 1 is kept in equilibrium
and players i > 2 keep playing their initial strategy. The procedure continues till all
players are in equilibrium. However, it may happen that along the path no equilibrium
for say player j > 1 can be found. Then the equilibrium for player j  1 is distorted and
another equilibrium for that player is searched for. Thus, in theory it may happen that
the algorithm goes back from a situation at which all but one player are in equilibrium to
the one-person equilibrium problem. However, Howson (1972) shows that the algorithm
always converges to an equilibrium. The Howson algorithm can be seen as a special case
of the algorithm by Wilson (1971) that is designed for solving general noncooperative
games in normal form.
Our algorithm seems to have some advantages above the method of Howson. First
of all the game-theoretic interpretation of the latter algorithm is not attractive. The
players are considered one by one, whereas we consider them all at once thereby using
more information. Moreover, our procedure is allowed to start at an arbitrary strategy
vector, whereas the Howson method has to start from a pure strategy vector. As a
result our procedure may be able to nd more equilibria than the Howson procedure.
In fact, the dierences between both methods correspond to the dierences between the
procedures of van den Elzen and Talman and Lemke-Howson for the case of bi-matrix
games (see van den Elzen (1990)).
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